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Abstract:
The concept of closure, almost unknown two decades ago, has had a meteoric rise. It has
been enthusiastically embraced by the legal system not only as a legitimate psychological
state, but as one that the criminal justice system ought to help victims and murder
survivors to attain. In the death penalty context, the concept of closure has changed the
way we talk about the rationale for capital punishment, it has changed the shape of the
legal process, and it has even changed what both survivors and jurors in capital cases
expect to feel. Yet, as I will illustrate, the term closure in fact connotes several different
and poorly differentiated concepts, each with separate and quite serious implications for
the conduct of the capital trial. For example, depending on how closure is understood, it
might require a chance to give public testimony, an opportunity to meet with the accused,
a more expeditious trial, a sentence of death, or an execution. Yet there is inadequate
evidence on whether any of these institutional processes or outcomes can actually
contribute to a state of closure for survivors.
As current research in disciplines including cognitive neuroscience, sociology,
psychology, and political science suggests, emotions are dynamic processes that evolve
in a reciprocal relationship with social structures. As the legal system becomes
increasingly invested in helping victims and survivors achieve closure, we need to take a
hard look at the emotional content of this concept, and at how it affects, and is affected
by, the institutional framework in which it operates.

VICTIMS, “CLOSURE,” AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF EMOTION
By Susan Bandes*

For the families of murder victims,1 the grief, anger and pain a murder leaves in
its wake must to some degree unfold in public, institutional settings. Grieving is rarely an
entirely private, internal experience. In every culture, grief is experienced and expressed
against a background of social expectations, and ideally, within a network of social
support. The expectations facing murder survivors include the grim task of cooperating
with the criminal justice system, a task that may include a public trial and intense media
scrutiny. Over the last couple of decades, this grim task has undergone a “symbolic
transformation,”2 particularly in the death penalty context. Every aspect of the capital
system has been recast as serving therapeutic goals; specifically, helping survivors heal
and attain closure. This incursion of the language of emotion and healing into the legal
realm has been insufficiently examined, especially given its enormous practical and
symbolic consequences for the operation of the death penalty.
Closure is a term with no accepted psychological meaning. It is, in fact, an
unacknowledged umbrella term for a host of loosely related and often empirically
dubious concepts. Nevertheless, it is a concept that has had a meteoric rise, both in the
public consciousness and in the legal arena.3 Virtually unmentioned only two decades
ago, closure has been enthusiastically embraced not only as a legitimate psychological
state but as one that the legal system ought to help victims and survivors to attain. In the
* Distinguished Research Professor, DePaul University College of Law, Visiting Professor, University of
Chicago Law School, 2007-2008. I am grateful to Erin O’Hara for organizing and including me in the
“Conference on Group Conflict Resolution: Sources of Resistance to Apology, Forgiveness and
Reconciliation” for which this paper was written, to Al Alschuler, Jeffrie Murphy, Martha Nussbaum, Erin
O’Hara, Carol Sanger, Jeremy Waldron, Noah Zatz, and colleagues at the Ohio State University Moritz
College of Law, St. Johns’ Law School, the University of Chicago Law School and Vanderbilt Law School
for their incisive comments on earlier drafts of this paper, and to Laura DeMichael of the University of
Chicago Law School Class of 2009 for excellent research assistance.
1
I will use the term “survivors” to connote family members and others bereaved by murder.
2
Frank Zimring, the Contradictions of American Capital Punishment at 48 (New York: Oxford University
Press 2003).
3
Frank Zimring found that prior to 1989, the terms “closure’ and “death penalty” were never mentioned
together. They were linked once in 1989. Starting in 1993, the mentions grew geometrically to more than
500 in 2001. In 2001 an ABC News/Washington Post poll asked whether the death penalty is fair because it
gives closure to the families of murder victims, and 60 percent agreed with this statement strongly or
moderately. Id.
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death penalty context, its rapid embrace has changed the way we talk about the rationale
for capital punishment, it has changed the shape of the legal process; it has even changed
what both survivors and jurors within the capital system expect to feel.
The term closure has come to connote several different and poorly differentiated
concepts, each with separate and quite serious implications for the conduct of the capital
trial. Closure is sometimes used to refer to the sense of catharsis that comes of speaking
publicly about one’s loss. Advocates of victim impact statements argue that the
statements assist with healing and closure because they permit survivors to give voice to
their pain and sense of loss in a public setting.4 Closure has also come to stand for the
constellation of feelings—peace, relief, a sense of justice, the ability to move on—that
come with finality. The term sometimes refers to the ability to find answers to the terrible
questions a murder may leave open—the circumstances of the murder, the identity of the
killer.5 This sort of closure might require solving an open crime, but it might also involve
some sort of interaction with the killer; an attempt to learn more.6 It might require a
verdict and imposition of a sentence.7 In the capital context, it might require a sentence of
death. The logical outgrowth of this argument is that only an execution can provide

4

See e.g., Edna Erez, Who’s Afraid of the Big Bad Victim? Victim Impact Statements as Victim
Empowerment and Enhancement of Justice, 1999 Crim. L. Rev. 545, 550-53.
5
See e.g., Chip Brown, The Confessor: Conversations with a Serial Killer, New York Times Magazine 39,
41, April 29, 2007 in which a detective uses the term to describe a motive for his quest to solve open
murder cases. See also “For the Family of Sneha Anne Philip, Closure,” New York Magazine, January 31,
2008 (discussing the efforts of the family of a woman missing since September 10, 2001 to prove that she
had died at the World Trade Center rather than as the victim of a crime in which her own recklessness
might have played a role, and their vindication in a Manhattan appellate court).
6
See e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Procedure, 4 Ohio State Criminal Law Journal 329,
336-37 (2007) (“many [victims] want to confront offenders face to face, tell their stories, and understand
why their crimes happened.”)
7
In their review of news articles about executions which recount the reactions of the victims’ family
members, Sam Gross and Daniel Matheson found a broad range of reactions. Among the minority who said
they experienced some sort of closure, the term was given several different meanings, including relief that
the long court process had ended, relief that the defendant could not hurt anyone else, and relief that the
defendant would stop receiving so much press attention. None claimed that their suffering for the loss
would be in any way alleviated by the execution. Samuel R. Gross and Daniel J. Matheson, What They Say
at the End: Capital Victims’ Families and the Press, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 486, 490-94 (2003). See also Vik
Kanwar’s interesting discussion of closure as a “sanitized version” of the more visceral “satisfaction.” Vik
Kanwar, Capital Punishment as “Closure:” the Limits of a Victim-Centered Jurisprudence, 27 NYU
Review of Law & Social Change 215, 248 (2001).
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closure, and that delays and impediments to execution deprive survivors of the closure
they need.8
Each of the above meanings of the term closure has been offered as the rationale
for various initiatives that have helped transform the capital system. It has become the
predominant argument for victim impact testimony. It has become an effective argument
for limiting procedural protections that delay conviction, sentencing, final judgment or
execution. It has taken on the authoritative ring of a clinically accepted reason for
execution itself. In short, it has transformed expectations about the purposes of a capital
trial, offering a promise to survivors and society at large that the legal system may be illequipped to keep. And at the most basic theoretical level, closure has recast the
traditional debate about the purposes of capital punishment, suggesting that support for
the death penalty can be premised on the urge to offer solace and healing to survivors of
murder.
On one level, there is an irony to the success of closure as a legal concept. The
phenomenon seems to contradict the conventional wisdom that the legal system abjures
emotion as an unwarranted interference with rational deliberation. At first glance it might
even seem to be good news for those who argue in favor of recognizing emotion’s role in
the deliberative process. I argue, to the contrary, that the unwarranted embrace of closure
should be understood as a consequence of the law’s unwillingness to grapple with the
role of emotion. This unwillingness is often expressed as a mistaken belief that it is both
possible and desirable to banish emotions—as a class—from the legal realm, except in
carefully delineated contexts.9 The closure phenomenon illustrates the converse
mistake—a belief that certain emotional claims should be sacrosanct; off limits to the
rigors of legal analysis. The better approach is to recognize that emotion influences legal
actors and legal institutions in numerous ways, some desirable and some undesirable. The
questions are: how do various emotions operate in various contexts, and to what extent
8

For example closure is cited by lower courts as a value militating against granting defense motions that
might delay or reopen a capital case. See e.g., Grayson v. King, 460 F.3d 1328 (11th Circ 2006) (describing
the government’s compelling interests, which in this case outweighed the capital defendant’s due process
argument for post conviction access to biological evidence, as including “guarding against a flood of
requests, protecting the finality of convictions, and ensuring closure for victims and survivors.”) See also
Skaggs v. Commonwealth, 2005 WL 2314073 (2005) and State v. Korsen, 141 Idaho 445, 111 P.3d 130
(2005) (citing survivor and victim closure as interests weighing against reopening or delaying a verdict.)
9
Susan Bandes, The Passions of Law, Introduction (1999).
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should they be encouraged or discouraged? These descriptive and normative questions
cannot be addressed as long as emotions are ignored and denied on the one hand, and
enshrined and insulated on the other.
In this article, I argue for the importance of evaluating emotional dynamics in
social context. An emotional process or outcome that advances familial, spiritual or
therapeutic goals may be poorly suited for a court of law. For example, when we speak of
healing or closure, we ought to attend closely to the emotional outcomes we are trying to
facilitate, and to whether a capital proceeding is an appropriate place to facilitate them.
As I will argue, the failure to grapple with the role of emotion in law generally, and with
the role of particular emotions in specific social settings, has had enormous consequences
for capital jurisprudence and the operation of the capital system.10

The Sociology of Emotion
Twenty five years ago, in The Managed Heart, her seminal work on the sociology
of emotion, Arlie Hochschild identified the tendency to treat emotions and private and
internal as one of the major barriers to serious inquiry into the nature of emotions.11 As I
will argue, this tendency is also a barrier to constructing and maintaining fair and
effective legal institutions. When emotions are regarded as a-contextual entities rather
than dynamic processes, it appears seductively logical to extrapolate from studies of
private, internal emotion to contexts involving complex groups, or involving public
settings. And the social sciences for too long took precisely this approach: studying
individual subjects and their individual emotions,12 and then assuming the knowledge
had broad application to emotions in diverse contexts.13
More recently, a number of disciplines have begun focusing on emotion in social
context. The sociology of emotion is now a burgeoning field.14 Psychologists are
10

See supra text accompanying notes 46-120.
Arlie Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling at 201-203 (Berkeley:
University of California Press 1983).
12
Psychologist Dacher Keltner, director of the Berkeley Social Interaction Laboratory, states that 95% of
all studies of emotion involve individual subjects (email from Dacher Keltner to Susan Bandes, May 2,
2007, on file with author).
13
Jerome Kagan observes that social scientists tend to “generate hypotheses from abstract concepts rather
than concepts that are closely tied to observed phenomena.” Jerome Kagan, Three Seductive Ideas at 78
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press 1998).
14
Jonathan H. Turner and Jan E. Stets, The Sociology of Emotions at 1 (2005).
11
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increasingly interested in emotion and social cognition, emotional dynamics in group
settings,15 and the interaction between emotion and culture.16 Political scientists are
beginning to think about the role of emotion in democratic deliberation.17 The emerging
field of affective neuroscience is examining the neural dynamics of emotional
interchange. One of its founders, Richard Davidson, observes “You can’t separate the
cause of an emotion from the world of relationships—our social interactions are what
drive our emotions.”18
In short, we know that emotions are not formed, experienced or expressed in a
vacuum. There are likely some basic emotions that exist across cultures,19 but even as to
those, social context shapes not only how they are communicated to others, but how they
are formed, experienced and interpreted by the individual.20

And once inter-group

behavior is added to the mix, questions arise both about how the expression and
interpretation of emotion change in a group context, and about how an emotional climate
may arise in a group—through mechanisms like emotional contagion and
synchronization.21
15

See e.g., Eliot R. Smith, Charles R. Seger and Diane M. Mackie, Can Emotions be Truly Group Level?
Evidence Regarding Four Conceptual Criteria, 93 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 431 (2007).
16
See e.g., Paula M. Niedenthal et al, Psychology of Emotion: Interpersonal, Experiential and Cognitive
Approaches (2006).
17
Sharon Krause, Public Deliberation, Democratic Politics, and the Feeling of Impartiality, paper presented
at the conference Law and the Emotions: New Directions in Scholarship, Boalt Hall Law School at U.C.
Berkeley, February 8 and 9, 2006, available at
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/csls/lawemotion_conference/PublicDeliberation_paper.pdf
See also Drew Westen, The Political Brain: The Role of Emotion in Deciding the Fate of the Nation
(2007); George E. Marcus, The Sentimental Citizen: Emotion in Democratic Politics (2002).
18
Richard Davidson, director of the Laboratory for Affective Neuroscience at the University of Wisconsin,
quoted in Daniel Goleman, Social Intelligence: The New Science of Human Relationships at 83 (2006). See
also Richard J. Davidson and Steven K. Sutton, Affective neuroscience: the emergence of a discipline, 5
Current Opinion in Neurobiology 217 (1995).
19
The extent to which emotions are biologically rooted is also an important and burgeoning area of study.
See e.g., Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of
Consciousness at 51 (1999). Damasio refers to a group of primary or universal emotions: happiness,
sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust, and to a larger group of secondary or social emotions, and argues
that although culture and learning can alter the expression and meaning of emotions, all share a biological
core. See also Erin O’Hara and Douglas Yarn, On Apology and Consilience, 77 Wash. L. Rev. 1121, 114031 (2002) (discussing biologically rooted taste for apology and forgiveness); Peggy Thoits, The Sociology
of Emotions, 15 Annual Review of Sociology 317, 320 (1989) (noting the ongoing debate about socially
constructed versus basic or biologically rooted emotions); Andrew Ortony and Terence J. Turner, What’s
Basic About Basic Emotions?, 97 Psychological Review 315 (1990) (raising the possibility that the concept
of basic emotions is an article of faith).
20
See e.g., Turner and Stets, supra note 14, ch. 1, Conceptualizing Emotions Sociologically (2005).
21
See e.g., Sigal G. Barsade, The Ripple Effect: Emotional Contagion and its Influence on Group Behavior,
47 Administrative Science Quarterly 644-675 (2002).
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It is becoming increasingly clear that understanding of these dynamics is an
interdisciplinary project. The need for interdisciplinary interchange highlights the
importance of specifying context. A neuroscientist seeking to measure fear responses in
the amygdala of lab rats, an anthropologist comparing cultural responses to the approach
of strangers, and a psychologist studying fear of maternal separation in infants may have
much to learn from one another, but they first have to find a common language. Their
uses of the term “fear” describe different agents, targets, contexts, methodologies, and
research goals, and the term will be useful only if these are specified.22 The use of the
term altruism provides another example of the problem: whereas psychologists puzzle
over the motivations for altruism,23 philosophers are divided over whether to define it in
terms of a mere willingness to aid others, irrespective of motivation,24 and evolutionary
biologists often use it to describe behavior such as helping one’s kin in order to promote
replication—in other words, behavior that common parlance is unlikely to classify as
strictly altruistic.25
The imprecise use of terms describing emotional states and processes may hinder
rather than facilitate interchange. Left undefined or insufficiently contextualized, these
terms may serve only to conflate and confuse concepts that diverge in important respects.

22

Kagan, supra note 13 at 14-38.
See e.g., C. Daniel Batson, Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic? 20 Advances in Experimental
Social Psychology 65 (1987).
24
There is no agreement on the relevance of motive in the philosophical literature. Many philosophers
would use the common meaning of the term altruism, which is “an unselfish regard for the welfare of
others,” (Merriam Webster dictionary); that is, they would require some sort of benevolent motivation, such
as compassion or concern for others (see letter from Jeffrie Murphy to Susan Bandes, May 28, 2007 (on file
with author)). However Thomas Nagel, in his well- known formulation, asserts: “By altruism I mean not
abject self-sacrifice, but merely a willingness to act in the consideration of the interests of other persons,
without the need of ulterior motives.” Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism at 79, Oxford: Clarendon
Press (1970). See also 10 Social Philosophy and Policy Volume 1 (Winter 1993) (an entire issue devoted to
the philosophy of altruism).
25
The classic behavioral definition of altruism is “behavior that benefits another organism, not closely
related, while being apparently detrimental to the organism performing the behavior, benefit and detriment
being defined in terms of contribution to inclusive fitness.” Robert L. Trivers, The Evolution of Reciprocal
Altruism, 46 Quarterly Review of Biology 1, 35-37 (1971). The adaptationist view, however, focuses on
evolved design rather than behavior; processes such as ‘kin selection’ and ‘reciprocal altruism’ lead to the
evolution of mechanisms designed to deliver benefits to other organisms because such behaviors lead to the
replication of the genes that underlie them. John Tooby and Leda Cosmides, Friendship and the Banker’s
Paradox: Other Pathways to the Evolution of Adaptations for Altruism, Proceedings of the British
Academy 88, 119-43 (1996); Robert Kurzban, Biological Foundations of Reciprocity, in Trust, Reciprocity,
and Gains from Association: Interdisciplinary Lessons from Experimental Research at 105-127 (E. Ostrom
and J. Walker eds. (2003)). I’m grateful to Rob Kurzban for his guidance on these issues.
23
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There is no accepted definition of the term emotion. Indeed, the more light is shed
on the dynamics of cognitive processing, the less clear it is that emotion defines a discrete
function or phenomenon. Current neurobiological research views emotions as a set of
processes, distributed throughout the brain, that assist us in appraising and reacting to
stimuli, and that are very sensitive to context.26

Recent work in psychology and

sociology also portrays emotions as processes; formed, interpreted and communicated in
social context.27 They influence the way we screen, categorize and interpret information.
They influence our evaluations of the intentions and credibility of others. They help us
decide what is important or valuable. Perhaps most important, they drive us to care about
the outcome of our decision-making, and motivate us to take action, or refrain from
taking action, on the situations we evaluate.28 All these processes are shaped, refined and
communicated in a social and cultural context.
The insight that emotional experience and expression vary across contexts and
cultures has to some degree entered conventional wisdom. We commonly speak, for
example, about shame cultures and guilt cultures,29 or about honor cultures—the vigilante
tradition30 in certain southern states, for example. My focus here is on the fact that
emotion norms vary not only across geographic lines, but among other more subtly drawn
“emotion cultures” as well. The distinctions among these emotion cultures are in part
about the acceptable expression of emotion. Display rules31 regulate the acceptable range
of emotional behavior and provide scripts for socially appropriate enactment of emotion.
26

See generally 22 Emotion Researcher (2006-2007). (The Emotion Researcher is the Official Newsletter
for the International Society for Research on Emotion).
27
See e.g., Turner and Stets, supra note 14 at 1.
28
See e.g., Elizabeth A. Phelps, The Interaction of Emotion and Cognition: Insights from Studies of the
Human Amygdala, in Emotions and Consciousness (Lisa Feldman Barrett et al. eds. 2005); Antonio R.
Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (1994) (somatic marker hypothesis);
Joseph Forgas, Mood and Judgment: the Affect Infusion Model, 117 Psychol. Bulletin 39 (1995); Oliver
Goodenough and Kristin Prehn, A neuroscientific approach to normative judgment in law and justice. Phil.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B 359 at 1717 (2004).
29
See e.g., http://mtsu32.mtsu.edu:11283/shame_guilt.htm (last visited May 30, 2007), a web page charting
the differences between shame cultures and guilt cultures for the benefit of students planning to study
abroad.
30
Zimring, supra note 2 at 89.
31
See e.g., Thoits, supra note 19 at 322. The work of Erving Goffman on interaction rituals is seminal to
the study of cultural scripts for performing and interpreting emotions. See e.g., Erving Goffman, Interaction
Ritual: Essays on face-to-face behavior (1967); Erving Goffman, The presentation of self in everyday life
(1959); Erving Goffman, Frame analysis: an essay on the organization of experience (1974). Goffman
“considered himself to be a disciple of Emile Durkheim, especially Durkheim’s late work on religion.”
Thoits, id at 27. See e.g., Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1965).
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Sociologists have been investigating the means by which emotion cultures transmit not
only display rules (expression norms), but also feeling rules (emotion norms), which
“specify the emotions that individuals should feel in a situation.”32 For example, Candace
Clark’s influential study of sympathy norms describes implicit rules governing both the
feeling and expression of sympathy—rules which vary across cultures, across time, and
by class and gender.33 Sociologists argue that these implicit rules and norms teach us
what we ought to be feeling, and in doing so, guide the way we shape and experience our
inchoate emotions.34 The investigation of feeling rules is a complex topic, comprising a
wide range of sociological approaches to which I cannot do justice here.35 The emotion
cultures that develop these rules may be geographical—such as the shame and guilt
cultures mentioned earlier. They may be temporal.36 Notions of romantic love—what it
feels like, when one ought to feel it and for whom, whether it’s important—-shift over
time and among cultures.37 Some emotion cultures are quite localized and specific. An
early and seminal investigation of an emotion culture and its feeling rules was Arlie
Hochshcild’s study of feeling management among flight attendants.38 As Hochschild
showed, emotion cultures may be identified by gender and status hierarchy, among other
variables. Legal institutions contain and comprise many overlapping “micro” emotion
cultures—the culture of the courtroom or the jury room, for example.39

32

Thoits, supra note 19 at 323.
See Candace Clark, Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life (1998), discussed in Thoits id at
323 (examining “sympathy norms and the rules of sympathy exchange.”)
34
See Candace Clark, Misery and Company: Sympathy in Everyday Life (1998), discussed in Thoits id at
323 (examining “sympathy norms and the rules of sympathy exchange.”)
35
For excellent summaries of the work in this area, see Thoits, supra note 19 and Turner and Stets, supra
note 14
36
For example, American Studies professor Joel Pfister noted in his contribution to the volume Inventing
the Psychological that “some Western emotions, once deemed vital to human essence, are now obsolete
(the medieval notion of ‘accide’ or losing one’s zeal for praying, the Renaissance notion of melancholy.”
Joel Pfister, On Conceptualizing the Cultural History of Emotional and Psychological Life in America at
22, in Inventing the Psychological: Toward a Cultural History of Emotional Life in America (Pfister and
Schnog eds. 1997).
37
See e.g., Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love (in Bandes, The
Passions of Law, supra note 9).
38
Hochschild, The Managed Heart, supra note 11.
39
No single institution operates independently, of course. To study the culture of the capital system
implicates a web of interlocking institutions, including the criminal justice system, the jury system, police
and prosecutors, the prison system and the media.
33
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The Reciprocal Relationship between Emotion and Social Structure
When we use internal emotional processes or reciprocal private exchanges as the
model for all emotional dynamics, we lose essential information about how emotion and
law interact. We proceed on faulty assumptions about human behavior in the legal
context, and about how to structure legal institutions in light of that behavior. These
institutions, as Martha Nussbaum observes, “can either promote or discourage” emotions,
“and can even shape [emotions] in various ways.”40 This is not solely a top-down
process.41 Institutional structure is influenced by assumptions about what people feel and
ought to feel.
For example, we have developed a thriving set of “grief industries” in the U.S.
which are premised on certain assumptions (many of them empirically dubious) about
when and how grief needs to be managed, or even left behind.42 Similarly thriving are
anger management programs, some of them flourishing because of referrals from the
judicial system,43 though the premises of anger management are quite controversial
generally, and particularly dubious in certain legal contexts.44
On a more basic level, institutions both reflect and shape our emotional
commitments.45 For example, institutional structures and expectations can channel
victims’ complex and evolving set of needs in various directions, reflecting a range of

40

Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions at 405 (2001) (discussing the
power of institutions to influence emotions that impede appropriate compassion).
41
Id.
42
See e.g., Jerome Groopman, The Grief Industry, The New Yorker, January 26, 2004.
43
See e.g., U.S. v Bull, 214 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2000) (upholding district court’s imposition of anger
control treatment and requirement that the defendant pay for the treatment as properly falling within
statutory authorization to impose “special conditions of supervised release” in case involving unauthorized
use of a VISA card); State of Oregon v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697 (1998) (upholding trial court’s imposition, at
parole revocation hearing, of condition that abusive father refrain from fathering any additional children
until he had completed drug treatment and anger management programs).
44
See e.g., Benedict Carey, Anger Management May Not Help at All, New York Times, November 24,
2004 (noting that state and county programs have been set up without supporting research on effectiveness
of anger management, and that studies show that the programs are often ineffective and sometimes
exacerbate anger); Molly Butler Bailey, Improving the Sentencing of Domestic Violence Offenders in
Maine: A Proposal to Prohibit Anger Management Therapy, 21 Maine Bar J. 140 (Summer 2006) (noting
that in Maine, there are three approved sentences for domestic violence offenders: jail time, batterer’s
intervention, and anger management therapy, and arguing that anger management therapy is dangerous and
ineffective in this context and should be prohibited as a sentence).
45
In Nussbaum’s phrase, “compassionate individuals construct institutions that embody what they imagine;
and institutions, in turn, influence the development of compassion in individuals.” Nussbaum, supra note
40 at 405.
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attitudes toward criminality, victimization, and community.46 We should carefully
scrutinize the costs of importing the language and assumptions of private, dyadic emotion
into institutional contexts, rife with their own peculiar rules for the display and feeling of
emotion, and their own range of influence, both practical and symbolic.

Victim Impact Statements and the Public Expression of Grief
The incursion of the concept of ‘closure’ into the legal system illustrates the
dangers of failing to evaluate emotions and their dynamics in particular contexts. Closure
has been imported to the legal realm without regard for the differences between the
therapeutic, spiritual or familial contexts and the legal context, or between the private
realm and the public realm. The concept has fueled the reshaping of the institution of
capital punishment in significant ways47 —it has transformed the debate about the
legitimacy of capital punishment, and it has led to significant changes in the
administration of the capital system. These changes are part of a feedback loop. Survivors
have been promised that they will feel ‘closure,’ and come to expect that they will and
should feel it, and legal actors have come to believe they should help deliver it. And the
capital system must be perpetuated in order to continue to provide it.
In the capital context, the shift to the therapeutic is identifiable in changes both
ideological and concrete. It began with the efforts of victims’ rights advocates to gain
reforms in the treatment of victims and survivors.48 When crime victims organize to
combat their marginalized status and the lack of dignity they are accorded in the criminal
justice system, there are a number of goals they might pursue. Reform of the treatment of
victims in court is the most obvious place to begin. Beyond that, there is much
divergence. Organizers’ efforts might coalesce around restorative efforts like counseling
46

See infra text accompanying notes 47-50.
Although the concept is used in non-capital contexts as well, my focus here is solely on its use in capital
cases. Every legal context raises certain unique issues for victims and their role in the justice system. For
example, one study of victim impact statements and their reception by judges in non-capital cases found
that judges exhibited very different attitudes toward the appropriate expression of emotion by rape victims
and by domestic violence victims. See Mary Schuster and Amy Propen, Victim Impact Statements in
Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault Cases; Judicial Reaction (unpublished manuscript on file with
author). The capital system raises a number of unique issues, most obviously the role of survivors in the
system and the fact that the defendant may be executed.
48
See generally Douglas E. Beloof et al, Constitutional Implications of Crime Victims as Participants, 88
Cornell L. Rev. 282 (2003). See also Beck et al, Seeking Sanctuary: Interviews with Family Members of
Capital Defendants, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 382, 387-390 (2003 (describing the victims’ rights movement).
47
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and support programs, crime prevention initiatives, or victim-offender mediation.
Alternatively (or in addition), they might coalesce around demands for retributive
measures—-more punitive sanctions and restrictions of defendant civil liberties.49 As
criminologist Vanessa Barker found in a recent comparative study of victims’ rights
movements in California and Washington State,50

the directions victim reform

movements take and the goals they seek are heavily influenced by the political and
institutional structure in which they take shape.51
The most significant reform attained by the nascent victims’ rights movement in
the United States in the early 1980’s was the introduction of the victim impact statement,
a vehicle now in use in federal capital trials and in 35 of the 37 capital states,52 which
allows survivors to testify to the harm caused by the murder.53 In Payne v. Tennessee,54
the Supreme Court upheld the use of these statements in capital cases in the face of an
Eighth Amendment challenge, finding that they provided useful information to the jury at
the sentencing phase. It held they gave juries a fuller picture of the harm caused,55 and

49

I have argued elsewhere that although victims often set out to gain the former set of goals, in our current
adversary structure they tend to succeed mostly in attaining the latter. Susan Bandes, Victim Standing,
1999 Utah L. Rev. 331.
50
Vanessa Barker, The Politics of Pain: A Political Institutionalist Analysis of Crime Victims’ Moral
Protests, 41 Law and Society Review 619 (2007). Barker concludes that political structures that were
intensively polarized tended to deepen crime victims’ demands for vengeance and provide legal expression
for those demands, whereas political contexts with intensive civic engagement and well developed norms
of social trust and reciprocity tended to bring about pragmatic measures mixing restorative and restrictive
approaches.
51
It is beyond the scope of this article to consider fully the complex interaction of social, cultural, political
and legal forces that account for the evolution of the capital system in the United States generally, or the
increasing influence of the victims’ rights movement in particular. For influential explorations of these
issues, see eg. Zimring, supra note 2; Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History (2003);
David Garland, the Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (2001); James Q.
Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide Between America and Europe
(2005) and Jonathan Simon, Governing through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007).
52
Wayne Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, 19 Federal Sentencing Reporter 5, 9
fn19 (2006).
53
This is a topic I’ve visited before (Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63
U. Chi. L. Rev. 361 (1996)). In that paper I examined the arguments against the original premise for
upholding the use of victim impact statements—-specifically, their informational value. The question that
concerned the Court then was whether these statements would allow death sentences to be imposed based
on improper or irrelevant factors. My focus in this paper is mainly on the shift in rationales, and the use of
the healing and closure rationale. But it is also on what we have learned in the nearly 20 years since Payne
was decided, both about the actual workings of victim impact statements, and about emotion, cognition,
and institutions—and also what we still need to find out.
54
501 U.S. 808 (1991) (overruling Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987)).
55
Id at 825.
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made salient the unique individuality of the victim, illustrating why his death represented
“a unique loss to society and in particular to his family.”56
Gradually, the public act of conveying information about the victim, remembering
the uniqueness of the victim and describing the pain of the victim’s loss has been recast
as a way for the survivor to move toward healing and closure.57 The theme of the
courtroom as a place for closure or catharsis has become explicit in the years since
Payne. Lower courts explicitly invoke the importance of closure.58 Victim assistance
programs often advise survivors to testify as part of the healing process.59 Once survivors
are promised this opportunity to heal, the decision to exclude their testimony becomes,
not merely an evaluation of the information value of the statement, but an act fraught
with emotional meaning.60
What we are witnessing is a confusion or conflation of cultures—the therapeutic
and the legal; a mapping of the language of private grief onto an entirely different sort of
emotion culture—collective, public, hierarchical, adversarial, coercive. The emotional
dynamics of the capital trial in fact bear little resemblance to those of private expressions
of grief. The dynamics of this emotional interchange are comprehensible only in light of
its social and institutional context. If we read out its social and collective aspects we miss
information that is crucial to the operation of the capital system and to its ability to
provide just processes and outcomes for survivors, defendants, and the community.
56

Id.
Justice O’Connor touched on the idea that the statement is for the benefit of the victim in her concurrence
in Payne, in which she said “Murder is the ultimate act of depersonalization. It transforms a living person
with hopes, dreams, and fears into a corpse, thereby taking away all that is special and unique about the
person. The Constitution does not preclude a State from deciding to give some of that back.” Payne at 832
(O’Connor, J., concurring). As Robert Mosteller observes, “the argument is styled in terms of returning
something to the murder victims themselves, but obviously that action is symbolic. Its impact is for the
benefit of the victims’ families and friends…” Robert P. Mosteller, Victim Impact Evidence: Hard to Find
the Real Rules, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 543, 550 (2003).
58
See note 105, infra. As I will discuss in detail below, attaining closure has come to implicate not only the
survivor’s ability to be heard, but also the need for a sentence of death and an execution. See infra text
accompanying notes
59
See e.g., Criminal Justice Intervention, Victim Impact Statements, at
http://www.letswrap.com/legal/impact.htm (last visited April 13, 2007), a summary of information on
victim impact statements from the Minnesota Center for Crime Victim Services, stating that the statement
provides victims a right to address the court prior to sentencing, allows them to express the impact of the
crime on them and their families, and may aid victims in their emotional recovery. See also Mary Lay
Schuster and Amy Propen, 2006 WATCH Victim Impact Statement Study 6, available at
www.watchmn.org (last visited May 1, 2007), stating that “judges and advocates were generally in
agreement that the impact statement can be a powerful ‘part of the healing process’ for the victim.”
60
See discussion of McVeigh case infra text accompanying notes 103-118.
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As I will discuss, to treat the victim impact statement like a private or familial
expression of grief is to ignore the ways in which the survivor’s message is channeled,
translated, even transformed, in light of the expression rules and role expectations of the
forum. The extrapolation from the private realm also elides the competing agendas that
come into play when a survivor gives victim impact testimony in a capital trial.
Specifically, the survivor may find herself in conflict with or in reluctant collaboration
with a prosecutorial agenda that affects her own autonomy. Moreover, the audience for
the victim impact statement—at least the only audience with any power to act on the
information conveyed—is a collective entity: the penalty phase jury.
To understand how each individual juror reads the emotional content of the
testimony, how these interpretations change once the jury deliberates, and how the jury as
a collective body translates its responses into action requires an understanding of how
emotions develop in group settings in general, and in the particular setting of the capital
trial. And if we confuse the expression of grief at a capital trial with the grief expressed in
a familial or therapeutic setting, we miss the point of the whole exercise. The penalty
phase capital jury has only two possible ways to respond to the expression of grief—it
can sentence the defendant to death, or not.
Finally, if we view victim impact evidence apart from its institutional context, we
miss the feedback loop. We fail to consider the ways in which assumptions about grief,
healing and closure are affected by the capital system, and the ways in which the system
in turn is shaped by assumptions about these emotions.
To have an informed and constructive debate about the use of victim impact
statements or the role of the justice system in promoting closure, it is essential to focus on
how context affects the meaning of psychological terms. It is also essential not to lose
sight of the particular requisites of the legal context at hand—a system of capital
punishment governed by constitutional standards. The capital context gives rise to a
particular and in some respects unique set of risks, which cannot be weighed solely in
light of the possible therapeutic value of victim impact statements to survivors. There are
risks to survivors. Some survivors may benefit from the ability to participate, and some
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may feel co-opted or re-victimized by the process.61 There are also significant risks to the
capital defendant, who is entitled to a jury whose decision about whether to take or spare
his life is based on constitutionally acceptable criteria.62

The Role of the Survivor in the Capital System
For the survivor, the trial is a poor vehicle for authentic expression of emotion.63
It is, unavoidably, a ritualized public performance, with particular scripts, conventions,
and role expectations. For example, there are pressures for the statement to conform to
certain stock expectations64 about victimhood. Murder survivors are not a monolithic
group with identical emotions and perspectives,65 and moreover individual survivors may
find that while some emotions will never abate, others might diminish or intensify over

61

See Susan Bandes, Reply to Paul Cassell: What We Know About Victim Impact Statements, 2 Utah L.
Rev. 545, 551-52 (1999) (citing studies on victim satisfaction and noting lack of studies on psychological
effects of victim impact statements on murder survivors); Robert C. Davis and Barbara E. Smith, Victim
Impact Statements and Victim Satisfaction: An Unfulfilled Promise?, 22 Journal of Criminal Justice 1
(1994) (study of non-capital felony cases, finding little evidence that victim impact statements promote
victim satisfaction) and Robert Elias, The Law of Personhood: A Review of Markus Dirk Dubber’s Victims
in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights, 52 Buff. L. Rev. 225, 246 (2004) (arguing that
encouraging victims and survivors to voice hatred may increase sense of victimization).
62
This is not to suggest that the constitutional criteria are clear, or that their interpretation is free of
controversy—quite the contrary.
63
In general the extent to which it is possible to discern the authentic emotional states of others is itself a
“formidable epistemological problem.” See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive
Emotions, and the ‘Clumsy Moral Philosophy’ of Jesus Christ, in Bandes, The Passions of Law supra note
9 at 157 (discussing the problem of other minds). See also Jeffrie Murphy, Remorse, Apology, and Mercy,
4 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 437 (2007), arguing that “issues of deep character are matters about
which the state is probably incompetent to judge.” At times, the performance of an emotional state might be
sufficient, irrespective of underlying sincerity, depending on the context. See e.g., Brent T. White, Say
You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1261 (2006)
(arguing for the efficacy of forced apology in the civil rights context).
64
See e.g., Erving Goffman, Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face to Face Behavior at 48-50 (1967)
(discussing rules of conduct for presentation of self in particular roles). See also Markus Dirk Dubber,
Victims in the War on Crime: The Use and Abuse of Victims’ Rights at 188-192 (2002) (discussing stock
images of victims).
65
See Susan Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure: Forgiveness, Vengeance and the Role of Government, 5
Fordham Urban Law Journal 1599; Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, supra note 53 at 405-08; Wounds That Do
Not Bind: Victim-Based Perspectives on the Death Penalty (James R. Acker & David R. Karp eds. 2006);
Wayne A. Logan, Declaring Life at the Crossroads of Death: Victims’ Anti-Death Penalty Views and
Prosecutors’ Charging Decisions, 19 Crim. Just. Ethics 41, 48 (1999). See also Robert Renny Cushing and
Susannah Sheffer, Dignity Denied: The Experience of Murder Victims’ Family Members Who Oppose the
Death Penalty, published by Murder Victims’ Families for Reconciliation; Brief of Amici Curiae Murder
Victims’ Families for Reconciliation in Support of Respondent at 8, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551
(2005) (No. 03-633), 2004 WL 1588549.
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time.66 At most, the victim impact statement is a snapshot of feeling at a particular
juncture. But it is a distorted snapshot of that feeling. Ambiguity is not easily
accommodated. The statement is often drafted from a template. For example, the Mothers
Against Drunk Driving Victim Impact Statement Workbook provides both a template for
drafting the statement and a set of guidelines on the acceptable expression of emotion.67
It instructs victims and survivors to “write and speak from the heart about your pain.” Yet
it also instructs them not to vent their anger (“Your goal is to express your hurt and your
pain; not to blame.”)68

Evolution of feeling is also difficult to accommodate. The

emotions the survivor expresses during capital sentencing may change over time, but
there is unlikely to be another forum in which to express these changed feelings.
Sometimes survivors come to regret their role in the imposition of a capital sentence.69
Moreover, as sociologist Nick Tavuchis observed in the context of apology, once
the speech goes public, it implicates others with interests and commitments of their
own.70 The survivor preparing to give victim impact testimony generally works with the
prosecutor’s office, or with victim mediation agencies that are themselves working with

66

See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victims’ Rights, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 964-66(1985)
(discussing the evolution of emotions after victimization).
67
The MADD workbook asks a series of questions to assist victims in drafting their statements. Here is one
example:
The Emotional Impact
How do you feel emotionally when you wake up in the morning? What do you think about? How
often do you cry? Describe the last time you cried. What do you think about when you go to bed at
night? How difficult is it for you to sleep? How long do you sleep? Do you have nightmares?
About how much of every day do you feel sad? Do you feel more tired than you did before the
crime? Have you been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder, or any
other stress-related illness since the crime? Are you on any medications for those conditions?
Have you considered suicide since the crime? Have you had difficulties with relationships since
the crime? How has it affected your family life? Has your view of the world as a safe and fair
place changed since the crime? Has your spirituality changed since the crime?
Victim Impact Statement Workbook, at
http://www.madd.org/docs/Victim%20Impact%20Statement%20Workbook.pdf (last visited May 29,
2007).
68
MADD instructions, id (Let’s Get Started).
69
See Robert Jay Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Who Owns Death?: Capital Punishment, the American
Conscience, and the End of Executions at 204-210 (2002) describing some cases in which survivors who
began by supporting a death sentence came, for a variety of complex reasons, to oppose or regret the
execution of the condemned man. See also Jeff Goodell, Letting Go of McVeigh, New York Times
Magazine at 40, May 13, 2001 (recounting the change of heart of Patrick Reeder, who lost his wife and
mother- in- law in the Oklahoma City bombing.) See also MVFR amicus brief in Roper v. Simmons, supra
note 65 (noting that “execution of the offender causes some victims to feel implicated in another person’s
death.”)
70
Nicholas Tavuchis, Mea Culpa: A Sociology of Apology and Reconciliation at 51 (1991).
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the prosecutor.71 The prosecutor has traditionally possessed tremendous and often
unbridled discretion about who may give such a statement. Thus, for example,
prosecutors have on a number of occasions barred survivors who oppose the death
penalty72 from testifying,73 as the McVeigh prosecutors did when they refused to allow
the testimony of several such survivors, including Marilyn Knight, whose daughter was
killed in the Oklahoma City bombing.74 Even when prosecutors do not silence survivors,
they may explicitly or implicitly communicate their own views about which emotions are
appropriate to the occasion. Often these are emotions, such as anger and a desire for
vengeance, which may increase the possibility of a death sentence.75 To assume that the
survivor’s testimony is an authentic and therapeutic expression of emotion is to discount
the real possibility that the prosecution agenda may overwhelm the survivor’s voice.
In a private setting, moreover, an outpouring of sorrow would elicit a reaction—
comfort, sympathy. In a truly therapeutic setting, it would elicit a response from someone
trained to help. In a social setting it would be strange and cruel for such an expression to
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Sheri Lynn Johnson, Speeding in Reverse: An Anecdotal View of Why Victim Impact Testimony Should
Not Be Driving Capital Prosecutions, 88 Cornell L. Rev. 555, 559 (2003).
72
Payne did not rule on the admissibility of survivor opinion testimony about the proper sentence in capital
cases, a type of testimony that was previously held unconstitutional. Although the denial of survivor
opinion testimony might appear to apply to both pro and anti death penalty opinions, there are two reasons
why this may not be so. First, as Wayne Logan reports, judges appear more willing to allow “thinly veiled
pro-death penalty opinions” such as exhortations to the jury to “show no mercy,” testimony which the
Nevada Supreme Court allowed, characterizing it as “a request that the jury return the most serious
sentence it found appropriate.” Logan, Victim Impact Evidence in Federal Capital Trials, supra note 52 at
8, citing Witter v. State, 921 P.2d 885, 895-96 (Nev. 1996). Compare Robison v. Maynard, 943 F. 2d 1216
(10th Cir. 1991), in which the Tenth Circuit upheld exclusion of testimony of a survivor who planned to ask
for mercy, characterizing it as opinion testimony. Second, as I discuss below, testimony that does not bear
the hallmarks of a death penalty opponent, such as a plea for mercy or forgiveness, tends to be received by
the jury as a plea to impose a death sentence. See infra text accompanying notes 113-114.
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Bandes, Victim Standing, supra note 49 at 341 and n45. Charles Baird and Elizabeth McGinn describe
several such cases, including one in which the prosecutor sought to bar the mother of a murdered six year
old boy from either giving a victim impact statement or taking the stand at all, though he put her brother, a
death penalty supporter, on the stand. Charles F. Baird and Elizabeth E. McGinn, Re-Victimizing the
Victim: How Prosecutorial and Judicial Discretion Are Being Exercised to Silence Victims Who Oppose
Capital Punishment, 15 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 447, 466 (2004).
74
The federal Crime Victims’ Rights Act (18 USCA Sec. 3771, effective July 27, 2006) was passed to
address this problem and to protect federal crime victims’ right to be heard. See testimony of Marsha A.
Knight, A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Protect Victims of Crime: Hearing on S. J. Res. 6 Before
the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 70 (1997). There are numerous unresolved
questions about the scope and operation of the Act. However, it specifically states that it does not establish
grounds for an independent cause of action based on its violation. It further states that “nothing in this
chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer
under his direction.”
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See Dubber, supra note 64 at 188-89; Baird and McGinn, supra note 73 at 464-65.
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be met with silence, yet in the courtroom there is usually no response. Indeed, when
judges do attempt to respond, they often prove ill equipped to do so. For example they
may display discomfort or, on occasion, inappropriate reactions in response to the display
of emotion, or particular emotions.76 The victim impact statement, then, is quite unlike a
private outpouring of grief. It is better likened to a cathartic public ritual. Yet for the
survivor, there is no good evidence that giving victim impact testimony provides
catharsis, healing, or closure.77

Closure and the Culture of the Capital Trial
The legal use of the concept of closure raises all the aforementioned problems
about importing concepts from the therapeutic to the legal context. However, even in the
therapeutic context, the term “closure” has no accepted clinical psychological meaning.
As I noted earlier, despite its lack of bona fides, closure has been enthusiastically
embraced as a legitimate psychological state and, moreover, as a state that the legal
system ought to help victims and survivors attain.
As I have discussed elsewhere, most of us cannot know how we would react if we
were to lose a loved one to murder, and therefore
we ought to be very slow to judge what any particular individual in that
position ought to feel or want. But there is a separate question: the question of
the law’s proper role in helping victims or survivors achieve the closure they
need. That is where we do need to judge, and to decide. And where it becomes
important to at least try to untangle what one’s religion might urge, from what
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See Schuster and Propen, 2006 WATCH Victim Impact Statement Study, supra note 59 at 9-10. Schuster
and Propen reported, in the context of non-capital cases in which victim impact statements were given
before judges, that judges were often uncomfortable with negative emotions like anger and hatred, for
example. They stated: “While we observed several sentencing hearings in which judges made an extra
effort to welcome, thank, or even praise the victim, we did see one in which we wished the judge had made
more effort. The court waited a long time for the defendant, who was in custody for murdering his wife, to
be brought into court, and the judge was clearly concerned about getting back to a trial that he was
conducting. After the advocate read statements from the step-father and mother of the victim, the judge’s
only comment was “ok.” The attack was particularly brutal, so much so that the sentence was an upward
departure from the guidelines. We imagined that it would be hard for the victim’s family, who sat in the
gallery, to interpret just what that “ok” meant.” They also recounted instances in which judges were
inattentive or rude to victims. See also Wayne Logan, Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of
Terror, 96 Georgetown L. Rev. 1 (forthcoming 2008) (recounting disturbing stories of patronizing and
dismissive judicial reactions to accounts of victim suffering).
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Marilyn Peterson Armour and Mark S. Umbreit, Exploring “Closure” and the Ultimate Penal Sanction
for Survivors of Homicide Victims, 19 Federal Sentencing Reporter 105, (2006); Lifton and Mitchell, supra
note 69 at 204.
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psychiatry might try to achieve, from what politics might dictate, and all of
those from what the law can…even attempt to accomplish.78

When the capital system is conscripted as a means of providing the elusive state
of closure, the ambiguities of the term become dangerous. If it refers to catharsis only,
then perhaps the mere giving of a victim impact statement is enough. If it is aided by
information from the defendant about what happened and why, a different set of
questions is posed. In the courtroom, this quest for answers might be reduced to watching
the defendant’s demeanor and trying to read his reactions.79 If it requires a reaction from
third parties, it becomes important to clarify what sort of reaction is required, and from
whom, and whether it is the sort of reaction a capital trial can or should provide. If it
requires a more expeditious verdict, sentence or execution, this raises a host of questions
about due process.
Placing this emotional exchange in its institutional context is crucial. In the
particular context of the capital trial, the response to the survivor’s outpouring of grief
can come from only one source: the penalty-phase jury. And how does the jury interpret
what it hears? This question cannot be usefully considered if the jury is treated as a
collection of individuals, each reacting to the survivor’s story. The jury becomes its own
micro emotion culture, with its own ideologies about appropriate attitudes, feelings and
responses. As psychologist Craig Haney observed about the capital jury:
The courtroom becomes the jurors’ separate reality, and they spend weeks or
months in this legal world, amateurs in an arena of experts. Like all people in
unfamiliar and threatening situations, they become acutely sensitive to—and
highly dependent upon—the social cues and implicit messages they receive
from the legal experts around them.80
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Bandes, When Victims Seek Closure, supra note 65 at 1601-02.
Similarly, survivors may seek understanding from watching the defendant’s demeanor as he is executed,
as occurred during the execution of Timothy McVeigh. See cnn.com, Witnesses Describe McVeigh’s Last
Moments, http://premium.edition.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/11/mcveigh.witnesses/ (last visited June 1,
2007). See also Jody Lynnee Madeira, Blood Relations: Collective Memory, Cultural Trauma, & the
Prosecution and Execution of Timothy McVeigh (unpublished paper on file with author) (an in-depth
analysis of the importance to survivors and others of watching Timothy MvVeigh’s face as he was
executed). Another possible venue for this attempt to gain understanding is victim offender mediation. The
difficult questions that arise from a survivor’s attempt to gain understanding in this way deserve in depth
treatment this short article will not permit.
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Emotion is deeply implicated in decision-making. It helps us choose which
sources of information we will emphasize. It assists us in evaluating the intentions or
credibility of others. It helps us decide what is important and valuable. It motivates us to
take action. 81 Jurors make all these judgments in a collective context, in which they use
emotion to assess not only the trial unfolding before them, but the dynamics of the jury
room itself. Jurors make judgments about whom to trust, whom to attend to, and with
whom to empathize, and they make these judgments as a collective body. They appraise
witnesses, they watch the defendant’s demeanor carefully—trying to assess his level of
remorse, for example, or the fear he elicits in them. They appraise one another, and they
often make these appraisals across racial, ethnic and other divides, without realizing that
these divides may cause them to misread one another’s demeanor and misjudge the
emotions it conveys.82 They form social bonds, cliques and out-groups.83 They
experience a very intense form of emotional contagion: they enter into collective
moods,84 some more amenable to open and effective deliberation than others.85 We miss
all of these variables if we think about emotion shorn of its social context.
The emotional dynamics of victim impact statements are only beginning to
receive careful study. We need more information about the emotions these statements
evoke in both survivors and jurors and the effect of these emotions on sentencing. Given
how much there is to learn generally about group emotion, there is a particular need to
81

See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
For example, William Bowers, Benjamin Steiner and Marla Sandys found that white jurors interpreted
the demeanor of black defendants quite differently (and more harshly) than black jurors did: where a black
juror saw remorse and sincerity, a white juror saw incorrigibility and deceptiveness. They found that black
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focus on how victim impact statements affect the emotions of the jury as a collective
entity. Studies suggest that victim impact evidence, particularly when it conveys intense
emotional pain, evokes sympathy and anger in jurors. Jurors perceive greater suffering
after hearing such statements, and hear the emotional intensity of the statements as “a cry
for help or relief.”86 There is evidence that the anger they feel upon hearing victim impact
statements translates into feelings of punitiveness.87 There is also evidence, more
generally, that anger tends to interfere with sound judgment—it inhibits detailed
information processing, increases tendencies to blame, including misattributions of
blame, and exacerbates the urge to punish. In other words, it makes people want to punish
more harshly, and makes them less careful about whether they are punishing the correct
person.88 There is some evidence, albeit far from conclusive, that this punitiveness
translates into harsher sentences, including more death sentences,89 and that this desire to
mete out harsh sentences is most discernible after group deliberation.90
And thus, although the Court in Payne did not permit survivor opinion testimony
about the appropriate sentence in capital cases,91 one must look to the actual dynamics of
victim impact testimony to learn what message is, in fact, conveyed.92 A capital jury
faced with pain and grief, overcome with anger, does not have many social options at its
disposal. If it wishes to take action on its empathy toward the survivor, its grief at the loss
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Id at 444.
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of the victim and its anger toward the defendant, its only apparent option is to vote for a
sentence of death.
In this way, the survivor’s expression of pain becomes implicated in the
prosecution’s message to the jury—the message that jurors who truly feel this survivor’s
pain, and agree that the person he lost was unique and valuable, will vote to execute the
defendant.93 And thus it seems to follow, according to this macabre logic, that for
survivors, true closure will come when the defendant is executed, and anything that
stands in the way of a speedy execution denies them the closure to which they are
entitled. This valuation scheme may push survivors into a distressing dilemma. Survivors
who do not support the death penalty may feel the need to stay off the witness stand
rather than be conscripted onto the prosecution team, but in doing so may be painted as
(or may feel themselves to be) disloyal to the victim’s memory.94 For survivors who do
believe the system’s promises about closure, another type of distress may occur.
Survivors who do not experience the promised closure after giving testimony, seeing the
defendant receive a death sentence, or even watching the defendant die (as happened, for
example, to some of those who watched Timothy McVeigh die, watching his face in vain
for a hint of the “meaning” of their loved ones’ deaths),95 may suffer the pain of empty
promises and dashed hopes.96
The valuation scheme described above exerts a profound influence on the
structure of the capital system. It exerts pressure on legal actors down the line. It exerts
pressure on legislators to expand the list of death eligible crimes, or risk showing
disrespect for certain classes of victims.97 It exerts pressure on prosecutors to bring
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capital charges, particularly in high profile cases,98 and even to resist reopening a case
based on evidence tending to exonerate the defendant.99 It exerts pressure on jurors to
impose a death sentence. It exerts pressure on judges to deny continuances or appeals.100
It exerts pressure on politicians to “streamline” the capital system, for example closing or
truncating avenues of appeal.101 In general, it casts closure as an entitlement the court is
eager to protect, and appeals, stays, post-conviction petitions and other procedural
safeguards, as well as grants of clemency,102 as cruel barriers to closure.
Survivor Evidence in Mass Killing Cases
The use of victim impact evidence in criminal cases arising from terrorist attacks
in which large numbers of people have been killed (hereinafter “mass killing cases”)
raises another set of questions about the effect of context on emotional dynamics. Many
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of the difficult issues that arose during the McVeigh103 and Moussaoui104 trials, among
others, were the result of ambiguities about victim impact testimony that courts have
struggled with in capital trials generally: what is their purpose; who counts as a victim;
what sorts of harm are admissible; what is the court’s role in ensuring the testimony is not
unduly prejudicial? These issues have generated a voluminous literature, and I do not
intend to revisit them here. My focus in this section is on how the mass killing context
not only amplifies or exacerbates existing ambiguities about victim testimony, but affects
the emotional dynamics of the capital trial in ways that pose unique institutional
challenges.
As a general matter, high profile and politically charged mass killing prosecutions
like the McVeigh and Moussaoui trials vividly showcase the public performative aspects
of victim impact testimony, and the host of often conflicting legal, social and political
interests, pressures and agendas implicated in the struggle over who gets to shape the
presentation of victim impact testimony, and what form it will take. More specifically,
the mass killing cases place in sharp relief the basic question raised earlier: what purpose
are victim impact statements meant to serve? The ambiguity about their proper role
complicates the effort to use them wisely in these highly charged cases.
Perhaps, as Payne itself held, victim impact statements are meant to transmit
information. If so, courts should guard against redundant testimony. However, to
determine redundancy it is necessary to discuss what sorts of information victim impact
statements are meant to convey. Victim impact testimony is not meant to convey the fact
of the murder—that is established in the guilt phase. It conveys the emotional impact of
losing the particular victim. The informational value of this sort of testimony is difficult
to assess. Payne premises the right to give victim impact testimony on the importance of
conveying the uniqueness of each victim, and the Court more generally has
acknowledged the informational importance of narrative accounts.105 Thus it is arguable
that since each victim is unique, and each narrative account will convey information more
vividly than a cold evidentiary record, each survivor should be permitted to give a
statement. Alternatively, defense attorneys have argued, with predictable futility, that
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every loss of life is terrible and leaves devastation, and that at some point the testimony
becomes duplicative.106 Yet in these cases it is administratively impractical to permit
each of those affected to testify. In the Moussaoui case, for example, the government
created a database of 8,000 persons adversely affected by the attacks of September 11th,
and several hundred of them expressed an interest in testifying at the sentencing hearing.
Ultimately the government had to confine itself to what it called “a reasonable
sample…to convey properly the devastation…”107 Three dozen people were permitted to
give victim impact statements.
The mass killing cases highlight difficulties of drawing the line between
informational and prejudicial victim impact statements. The distinction borders on the
incoherent in the victim impact context generally, given that the value of the information
is its ability to evoke pain and make grief salient. In mass killing trials, it is difficult to
imagine a metric for determining the point at which the possible prejudicial effect of the
emotions evoked by the information outweighs the value of the information.108 Payne
and its progeny assume that victim testimony will not interfere with the jury’s
constitutional duty to consider the defendant’s mitigating evidence before determining
whether he deserves to die.109 But as Judge Matsch learned in the McVeigh case, it is
immensely difficult to regulate the emotional climate of the courtroom in a high profile
mass killing case. Despite his expressed intention to limit victim impact evidence to
“facts rather than emotional impact,”110 he eventually permitted more than three dozen
106
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victim impact statements. As one commentator noted, “the grieving process…and the
compelling emotional need for witnesses to pay homage to their loved ones and to find
some way of sharing their intense pain—rolled over everyone.”111 The effect of the
testimony was so powerful that even the judge and the reporters wept.112
If, on the other hand, victim impact statements are meant to serve as a vehicle for
healing and catharsis, the exclusion of any survivor testimony becomes problematic for a
different reason. Once the ability to make a statement is held out as a gesture of respect
for victims and a means toward healing for survivors, the exclusion of some survivors
comes to seem a cruel withholding—both of respect for the value of the victim’s life, and
of the survivor’s means of achieving closure.
The alternative to letting all survivors testify is to choose among survivors. There
is an irony here. As I have observed elsewhere, the “victims’ rights movement revives the
concept of privatized justice, by portraying the criminal case as a struggle between the
defendant and the victim’s family and by seeming to erase the role of the state.”113 One
perhaps unintended consequence of viewing the crime as a harm to individuals rather
than to the community as a whole is that it raises the question of which individuals will
be given a forum. If only some survivors will be permitted to testify, which victims get to
be remembered, and which survivors get to be heard? The situation is rife with pitfalls. In
the McVeigh case, the prosecutors excluded several survivors who opposed a death
sentence, whereas in the Moussaoui cases, survivors with a range of attitudes toward the
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death penalty were permitted to testify.114 Nevertheless, even in the latter case hundreds
of survivors who wanted to testify were precluded from taking the stand.115
More basically, the very question of who qualifies as a victim or survivor is
ambiguous. This ambiguity is not confined to the mass killing cases,116 but their
circumstances do exacerbate it. For example, the Moussaui case made liberal use of the
anthropomorphic notion of “institutional victims,” permitting medical rescue workers,
police and fire personnel and former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani to talk about
harms to their workplaces, the City of New York, the U.S. Government and the nation as
a whole.117 One survivor who lost her husband asked “Why Mayor Giuliani? I don’t think
he needs closure, and he didn’t lose loved ones.”118 The notion of institutional victims
compounds the irony I mentioned above. The privatized harm perspective, which was
meant to supplement the notion of crime as harm to the community at large, is here
supplemented by a notion of crimes against the community. However, the framework
requires those who wish to speak for the community to demonstrate the bona fides of
their victimhood.
Courts, unsurprisingly, are ill-equipped to make decisions about healing and
catharsis, and often seem stymied by the complex emotional dynamics survivor testimony
engenders in capital cases. Mass killing cases raise particular challenges that cannot be
usefully understood without inquiry into their particular emotional dynamics and how
these affect—and are affected by—the operation and goals of the capital system.

Conclusion: The Feedback Loop
Legal institutions inevitably rely upon implicit and explicit assumptions about
human behavior, and often these assumptions fail to reflect growing knowledge about
how institutional actors do in fact behave. It may not always be possible, or even
desirable, for legal institutions to incorporate evolving behavioral knowledge. It may not
always be possible, because legal institutions do not tend to have reliable mechanisms for
114
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incorporating the findings of relevant fields, such as the sciences or social sciences. It
may not always be desirable, because there may be countervailing considerations at play.
Accurate behavioral knowledge promotes many important goals in a system that relies on
predicting and channeling human behavior, but the legal system has other requisites as
well, including predictability, consistency and equality of treatment.119 Sometimes these
conflicting goals will require tradeoffs—-it is not always necessary or advisable to act on
knowledge about how emotion affects legal actors and legal institutions. But to make
these decisions intelligently requires knowledge about what is being weighed. Proceeding
in ignorance won’t make the difficult choices disappear; it will simply ensure that they
are made without sufficient information.
Although there is increasing recognition that cognition and emotion act in concert,
there is still a tendency to approach emotions as if they remains fixed across time, place
and social setting. Emotions are not static entities; they exist in dynamic reciprocal
relationships with social structure. To create and maintain effective and just legal
institutions requires a continuing effort to clarify institutional goals and to create
institutional structures that help legal actors facilitate those goals.
I have used the concept of closure to illustrate the pitfalls and consequences of
using emotion language in the legal context without sufficient attention to the content of
the emotional categories employed or to the institutional goals at stake. The term, as I
have argued, has a constellation of meanings, each of which has its own implications for
institutional structure. In the death penalty context, too often the term is used, not only
without clarity, but without regard for the constitutional requisites of the capital trial.
The theme of closure has reframed the entire death penalty debate. For many
years, support for the death penalty was premised on its deterrent function. More
recently, the weight of empirical evidence has rendered the deterrence rationale
increasingly tenuous.120 Retribution, the major alternative rationale, has always been a
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harder sell. Retribution at one time sounded too close to revenge, and made people
uncomfortable. The language of healing and closure has provided a way to soften the
retribution rationale. If the death penalty can help survivors heal, then retribution can be
viewed as therapy rather than bloodlust. Thus the notion of closure provides a rationale
for our continuing commitment to the capital system. At the same time, the perceived
requisites of closure have fueled changes in the structure of capital system, including the
victim impact statement, truncated appeals, and broadened categories of death eligibility.
In this way the feedback loop perpetuates itself. We have promised survivors that the
system can give them closure, and the institution of capital punishment now needs to
exist to give survivors the closure we’ve promised them. Unfortunately, this therapeutic
promise has little to do with the actual workings of our capital system: it’s a poster child
for the dangers of engrafting the private language of emotion onto a complex,
hierarchical and coercive governmental entity.
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